View On God

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A59O/B618				determine God's being.(54)
Kant tells us that there are exactly three ways of				As in Aquinas's view analogy is closer to equivocity
proving the existence of God by speculative reason.				than to univocity,(55) so is its unity to be found not
In the first, we begin from "determinate experience				in the single concept but in the single reality to which
and the specific constitution of the world" and ascend				all the analogates bear some proportion, order, or
from there to a supreme cause. "The world presents				relation.(56) Urine, medicine, and food can all be called
to us so immeasurable a stage of variety, order,				healthy, by extension, because we judge them to
purposiveness, and beauty" (A622/B650) that we				have an intelligible relation to the single reality of
may infer a sublime and wise cause (A625/B654).				animal health, which is the most natural subject for
This is the physico-theological proof or argument				the predicate "healthy." A meaning gets extended
from design. In the second, we begin from				analogically when a word is used to name a
indeterminate experience or "experience of existence				secondary analogate precisely because it is judged to
in general" and proceed once again to a cause. Here it				have an intelligible relation to the primary analogate.
does not matter what the world is like, but only that				Thomas also notes that in the case of God and
it exists; if the cosmos consisted of nothing but a				creatures, being and naming are not on the same
speck of dust, we would still need to posit a cause				plane:
for it. This is the cosmological proof. Finally, we may				Since we arrive at the knowledge of God through
bypass experience altogether and argue "completely				things other than God, the reality referred to by the
a priori, from mere concepts." This is the ontological				names predicated of God and other things exists by
proof, most audacious of all, as it premises nothing				priority in God according to his own mode, but the
about what exists. In this chapter I examine what				meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority,
Kant has to say about the cosmological and				and thus God is said to be named from his
ontological proofs. I consider them (as Kant does) as				effects.(57)
attempts to prove the existence not of the God of				While God, ontologically speaking, is the primary locus
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but of a primordial being,				for every analogical name shared with creatures, at
whose identity with the God of religion must be a				the epistemic level of knowing and naming, most
matter of further argument or faith.				names (except for a few like "God" and "YHWH")
A. The Ontological Argument				find their primary home in creatures and are then
The version of the ontological argument Kant				extended to refer to God.
considers is that of Descartes, not Anselm. 1 It may				In general throughout his works,(58) Aquinas rejects
be set forth as follows:				univocity as an appropriate epistemology for the
1. The ens realissimum (i.e., God) is, by definition, the				divine names because it would require him to
being who possesses all perfections.				contravene certain truths about God he already holds
. Since (a) existence is a perfection, (b) any being				dear: e.g., that God is incomprehensible, simple,
that possesses all perfections must exist. 3.				superexcellently perfect, that God does not
Therefore, the ens realissimum exists.				participate in any perfection but is that perfection
Kant is generally credited with originating what has				essentially, and that God's being and essence are
become the standard criticism of the ontological				identical. In a word, he rejects univocity because it
argument--that existence is not a predicate. His				derogates from the theological truth (known in
critique contains in addition two other objections that				judgment) of God's infinite transcendence, which he
he and his commentators do not always keep				has already established to his own satisfaction. He
separate from the first: in a predicative proposition				refuses equivocity because, at root, it would mean
you may always "reject the subject," and there is				that we could not know anything at all about God;
something logically defective in the concept of a				but he already knows he knows certain truths about
necessary being. I argue that one of these criticisms				God. However strange it may seem to modern ears
is cogent while the other two--including the famous				which, accustomed to Kantian sound waves,
one--are not.				instinctively place epistemology before ontology, and
B. Real Predicates				the discussion of the transcendental conditions for
Kant never enunciates the slogan so often attributed				knowledge before the avowed fact of knowledge
to him, that existence is not a predicate. What he				itself, Aquinas repudiates a univocalist epistemology
says instead is that existence is not a real or				on the basis of a theological ontology which subsists
determining predicate, that is, "a predicate which is				in judgments, and renounces an equivocalist
added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it"				epistemology on the grounds that it cannot do
(A598/B626). As always, by a 'predicate' he does not				justice to the very fact that we do make true
mean a linguistic item but a property or a constituent				judgments about God. On the second-order level of
of a concept. His contention may be understood in				epistemology, analogy is the only option which is
accordance with the following definitions:				genuinely responsive to the truths of Thomas's
A predicate P enlarges a concept C =Df ◇				first-order web of theological judgments. Only
∃x(Cx & -Px). (Note that "enlarge" may be a				analogy can justify epistemologically what he already
misleading term, insofar as enlarging a predicate typi				knows through his theological judgments, and thus
cally results in narrowing its extension.)				analogy can only be understood in terms of those
A predicate P is a real predicate =Df P enlarges at				same judgments.
least one concept. 2				But analogy is a highly paradoxical option,(59) for
It follows from these definitions that a predicate P is				analogical predications say something true about God
nonreal iff for any concept C, □(x)(Cx & Px				by using concepts whose meaning at the divine level
iff Cx). This makes clear the sense in which a nonreal				we cannot really understand.(60) For example, we
predicate "makes no addition" to any concept: if P is				can know the truth that God exists without knowing
nonreal, then saying that something is both C and P				what the divine existence is in itself.
says nothing not already implied by simply saying that				To be can mean two different things, signifying
it is C. 3				either the act of being, or the propositional
Is Kant correct in claiming that existence is not, in the				composition which the mind devises by joining
sense just defined, a real predicate? Yes, indeed:				predicate to subject. Taking to be in the first sense,
there is no concept C such that ∃x(Cx &				we cannot know God's being, nor God's essence; but
-Ex). This, at any rate, is a consequence of letting				only in the second sense. For we know that this
the existential quantifier express existence. 4 To				proposition which we forte about God when we say
suppose there is something (∃x ...) that does				"God is," is true.(61)
not exist (... -Ex) is to suppose there is something				Thomas's positive theology is rather like a blind
that there is not.				person pointing to and making true judgments about
Relative to widely accepted assumptions, then, Kant's				a reality which he or she cannot actually see. Even
dictum is true. The next question is, how does it				analogy itself is thoroughly suffused with a
show that Descartes's argument is wrong? How does				conceptual unknowing as referred to God, and with
the fact that existence is not a real predicate				the various dialectical moments of negative theology
invalidate the ontological argument or make it				outlined above.(62) Moreover, if we tend
unsound?				automatically to think of judgments as built up out of
One common suggestion is that only real predicates				concepts, so that the truth of judgments is
may be used in definitions, in which case it would be				dependent on the meaning of concepts, in the case
illegitimate for Descartes to define God as a being				of theological analogy we must reverse the direction
who, among other things, exists. 5 But this				and think of the very meaning of the divine names
suggestion is off the mark on two counts. First,				as dependent upon the truth of theological
Descartes is not guilty as charged. Look at his first				judgments.(63)
premise; it says that God has all perfections but				Finally, a concrete example may illumine what I think
makes no mention of existence. Of course, in the				Thomas has in mind when he places analogy at the
next premise, Descartes says that existence is one				nexus of his positive and negative theology. I can
of the perfections, so one may wish to say that he				point to some papers on a lectern and announce,
is implicitly if not explicitly defining God as a being				"Here is my talk"; I can also proclaim, while sweeping
who exists. But that brings us to the second point:				my arms in a 180-degree arc so as to designate the
what Descartes is charged with is no crime. There is				whole room containing both audience and lectern,
nothing wrong with using nonreal predicates in				"Here is my God." I have four points about these
definitions. Any tautological predicate (e.g., being red				two sentences. First, they are both instances of
or nonred) is as much a nonreal predicate as				analogical discourse since they both signify analogically
existence, but there is nothing logically vicious about				by means of a complex web of interlocking
the definition 'x is square =Df x is an equilateral				judgments, though the former is secular,
rectangle & x is red or nonred'. The second conjunct				noncontroversial discourse, while the latter is
in the definiens is idle but harmless.				theological, disputed discourse. The first sentence is
Perhaps it will be suggested that the premise that				analogical discourse because we implicitly relate it in
runs afoul of Kant's dictum is not the first but the				our minds to the very same sentence--"Here is my
second, for if existence "makes no difference" to				talk"--when it is used to refer to what comes out of
any concept, how can it be a perfection? A				my mouth while I am actually speaking. Because we
perfection might be thought of as a property that				understand the intrinsic relation between intelligible
contributes to the greatness of a thing, or makes an				verbal sounds and intelligible written marks on pieces
already good thing better than it would be without it.				of paper, we spontaneously extend the meaning of
But if existence "makes no difference" to any				the word "talk" by using it to make what we
concept, how can it be a perfection in this sense?				understand to be a true and literal, nonmetaphorical
How can an existent thing be better or more perfect				judgment: words on paper are truly my talk though
than a nonexistent thing ? 6				they are not exactly the same reality as my spoken
But this objection is readily sidestepped. As I have				words. The word "talk" receives its extended
formulated the second premise above, it consists of				meaning precisely by being understood and used in
a premise proper (whatever has all perfections				two different judgments about the real world which
exists) and a reason for it (existence is a perfection).				bear an intrinsic relation to one another; it does not
Perhaps Kant's dictum undermines or refutes the				possess its extended meaning beforehand all on its
reason offered for the premise, but it does not				own.
refute the premise itself. Quite the contrary: it entails				However, the second point says these two
the premise! If existence is implied by any concept				sentences are also quite different as instances of
whatsoever, then in particular it is implied by the				analogical discourse, since God is much more
concept possesses all perfections, and that makes				mysterious than any kind of talk whatsoever, is
the second premise true.				totally hidden from our powers of sensation, and is
Our verdict so far must be that Kant's most famous				obscure to our powers of conceptualization. If we
criticism of the ontological argument leaves it entirely				return for a moment to the two different
unscathed.				significations of the first sentence, "Here is my talk,"
On the other hand, there are Christians who have				we note that only the fourth word, "talk," actually
taken their stand on the right-hand Cliff of Univocity.				changes meaning from one context to the other; in
For them, our worldly knowledge and speech apply				both contexts, the word "here" refers to an area of
to God in the same way as they apply to the				space that can be pointed to, the word "is" retains its
realities of our world. There is nothing surprising or				meaning of temporally limited existence, and the
different about our knowledge and talk of God, for				word "my" signifies something I possess as having
God is simply the most excellent reality among all the				been produced by me. But if we compare the first
other realities of our world, different in degree but				with the second sentence, we find that not only the
not in kind from all the other objects of our				word "God," but even the first three words of each
knowledge. They may acknowledge that God is				sentence, together with the whole context in which
mysterious, but all the while they press for clear				they stand, demonstrated different semantic
conceptual distinctions and demand that God be				functions. Precisely because someone like Aquinas has
conceived in human terms. For them, our knowledge				already judged, within appropriate doxological and
and talk of God are as clear and bright as the air and				theological contexts, that God is a mysterious and
sunshine which surround them on the Cliff of				loving being unproduced by me whose illimitable
Univocity.				existence cannot be spatially or temporally
Still other Christians, however, would hold that talking				constrained--because of the supposed truth of such
about God is more like hovering dangerously				judgments--the meanings of the first three words in
between the Cliffs of Equivocity and Univocity while				each sentence cannot be the same. In the theological
peering and pointing below toward the Dark				sentence, the word "here" cannot refer to a spatial
Luminosity at the heart of the world. I hope to show				area but rather to a Mystery who transcends space;
in this article that Aquinas's understanding of God				the word "my" cannot refer to something I possess
-talk--which involves a unique, complicated, and subtle				but rather to a gracious Being who possesses me;
weaving of negative and positive theology, of				and the word "is" must not be limited to temporal
analogy and incomprehensibility--amounts to such a				existence.
hovering over the abyss.				The third point counters those who see a hidden
AQUINAS THE NEGATIVE THEOLOGIAN				core of univocity lurking in the meanings of the first
Aquinas the negative theologian stands in a long				three words of each sentence. They would be right
tradition reaching back to Hellenistic Judaism,(1) Middle				if those meanings were first abstracted as concepts
Platonism, gnosticism,(2) and many patristic writers. I				from our experience of God and creatures and then
will focus on the one we call PseudoDionysius the				later predicated as generic meanings of God and
Areopagite as the carrier of this tradition; for he not				creatures. But Thomas permits no latent univocal
only is the major source for Aquinas's negative				meanings, for we do not know what a concept really
theology but also stands in contrast to Thomas as an				means once it has been extended to God, which is
apophatic theologian. Most likely a Syrian writer who				why he constantly applies the correctives of
flourished around 500 and who attempted to				negative theology to the creaturely concepts we use
synthesize Neoplatonism with Christianity, he took				to speak about God. He does not use such concepts
the pseudonym of Paul's famous convert at Athens				because he sees how they apply to God's inner
mentioned in Acts 17:34 and thereby gained an				nature but because they are the best tools he can
almost apostolic authority for his writings throughout				find for trying to speak the Inexpressible. Eschewing
the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance.(3)				any prying into God's inner being, he would refuse
For Dionysius, God is not one of the beings;(4) the				the gambit of those who would try to force him to
essence-surpassing God is the God removed from				find common abstract meanings and content himself,
our knowledge, inaccessible to mind and speech and				as a negative theologian, with showing how God's
sight;(5) God is the unnameable one.(6) But Dionysius				perfections are not like ours.
faces a problem: How can the unnameable God be				Finally, however, Aquinas does think theological
praised by Scripture with all sorts of names?(7) He				discourse can extend creaturely concepts so that
tries to overcome the dilemma by balancing positives				they point to God and speak truthfully about God,
and negatives, theses and denials, so that he may be				even though they cannot give us insight into God and
true both to the scriptural praises and to the ultimate				cannot be distilled down to reveal a common univocal
unknowability of the Nameless One. In a passage				meaning. At this point, those who think they detect a
remarkable for the beautiful exactitude of its Greek				hidden equivocity lurking in the significations of the
rhetoric and the mystic fervor which inspires it, he				two sentences are deeply troubled: How can the
writes:				theological sentence mean anything at all if there are
God is known in all and separate from all; God is				no common meanings and if we do not know how
known through knowledge and through unknowing,				our concepts apply to God? Aquinas will respond
and of him there is understanding, reason,				that, at the level of judgment, the theological
knowledge, apprehension, perception, opinion,				sentence cannot be equivocal precisely because it is
imagination, and name and all other things--and yet he				true, although it expresses its truth by projecting
is neither understood nor spoken nor named; he is				creaturely concepts toward an infinite mystery which
not any of the beings nor in any of the beings is he				remains absolutely inconceivable. Whereas he rejects
known; he is all in all and nothing in anything; he is				equivocity due to God's incomprehensibility, he
known to all from all, and to no one from anything.(8)				repudiates equivocity on the grounds of the believer's
The specific nature of Dionysius's negative theology				ability to know some truth about God. In Aquinas's
is a much-debated question in contemporary				eyes, those who consider all speech about God to be
Dionysian scholarship. Does he have two negative				inherently equivocal are reduced in the end to holding
theologies, one rational and the other mystical, or				that we can never say anything true about God'
only one? The problem is compounded by the fact				even that God exists.
that, although in the third chapter of his Mystical				CONCLUSION
Theology and elsewhere he clearly distinguishes				Aquinas's theory of God -talk, a subtle and nuanced
rational affirmative theology from mystical negations				view which hovers over the divine abyss between
and unknowing, in his Divine Names we often				the crags of purely positive and purely negative
discover a mixture of positive and negative theology				theology, evinces Christianity's penchant for invoking
within rational theological discourse. However, even at				and positively identifying a God who is at the same
the conclusion of the Divine Names, which is a work				time essentially mysterious and hidden, a God who is
of conceptual, affirmative theology, Dionysius				neither univocally dissolved into us humans nor
mentions his preference for "the way up through				equivocally placed beyond every ability of ours to
negations" which "guides the soul through all the				know and name in prayer and worship. Thomas's God
divine notions, notions which are themselves				-talk blends both the positive and the negative, but
transcended by that which is far beyond every				the positive is foundational for the negative, for God
name, all reason and all knowledge."(9) Although he				is the pure positivity of infinite Being who in creation
does not treat his preferred way, that of mystical				has also acted positively on our behalf. This stance
negation, until the Mystical Theology, it has				accords well with the views of other theologians who
nevertheless already been functioning in the Divine				also see God as pure positivity, albeit in terms
Names as a corrective guide for affirmative notional				different from Aquinas's--Kasper, e.g., who sees God
theology.(10) Another passage clearly distinguishes				as pure and positive Love, or even Barth, who
the mystical from the notional and philosophical way				toward the end of his career finally admits that a
to God:				God -talk based on the world of creation and
Theological tradition has a dual aspect, the ineffable				redemption must have something positive to say if
and mysterious on the one hand, the open and more				Christ is ultimately the positive "Yes" from God to
evident on the other. The one resorts to symbolism				that world and from that world to God.
and involves initiation. The other is philosophic and				Aquinas's analogy-based theological epistemology only
employs the method of demonstration.... The one				escapes idolatrous univocity, however, to the degree
uses persuasion and imposes the truthfulness of				that it is based on judgment rather than concept, is
what is asserted. The other acts and, by means of a				continually interpreted by the dialectics of negative
mystery which cannot be taught, puts souls firmly in				theology, and is conscious that the concepts used in
the presence of God.(11)				its true judgments about God cannot give us any
I would argue that Dionysius has only one negative				insight into the inner nature of God. His theological
theology, a via negativa which is based on a mystical,				epistemology gladly grasps, as the only viable
nonconceptual grasp of God's transcendent				alternative, the inescapable paradox that in all our
supereminence and is opposed to all conceptual,				theologizing we link judgmental truth with conceptual
affirmative, positive theology.(12) For Dionysius, God				agnosticism.
is absolutely unknowable in conceptual, notional, or				Finally, Thomas's theological epistemology implies that
rational terms. Although the negative theology which				when we talk about God, the very meanings of the
appears in the Divine Names takes the form of				words we use are somehow dependent upon what
conceptual denials, in itself it is actually the polar				we hold to be true about God. From his perspective,
opposite of all conceptual activity and is written as a				our theological epistemology is ultimately based on
corrective by one who has already been mystically				the perceived truth-status of our foundational
plunged into the blazing, murky abyss of God.				theological judgments, not the other way around.
Ultimately, for Dionysius, the highest form of				This suggests that the theory of God -talk to which
theology is that beatific ignorance which transpires in				we subscribe will always be indebted to the truths
mystical union with God and which even transcends				about God we hold dear. (1) Echoes of Hellenistic
the very opposition between affirmation and				Judaism's negative theology are found in the New
negation.				Testament's assertions that God and God's ways are
Aquinas is indebted to Dionysius for the thesis of				invisible, immortal, ineffable, indescribable,
God's incomprehensibility; but at the same time he				unsearchable, and untraceable (Rom 1:20; 11:33; 2 Cor
mitigates the starkness of the axiom about God's				9:15, 12:4, 1 Tim 6:16). (2) Jean Danielou distinguishes
absolute unknowability and propounds a sanitized,				the three sources: "For a Jew, to say that God is
domesticated version of the Dionysian via negativa				transcendent is to say that he cannot be measured
so that it becomes a "way". fully at home within the				by any created thing, and is therefore
confines of a positive, affirmative theology. For				incomprehensible to the creaturely mind; but at the
Aquinas, God is indeed that supereminent darkness				same time it is to assert that his existence can be
which transcends our knowledge and leaves us in				known. For the Plantonist, to say that God is
ignorance; he approves of those who say that on				ineffable is to say that he surpasses any conception
Mount Sinai Moses "approached the darkness in which				of him that the mild can form in terms of the
God is";(13) in another passage he claims, following				sensible world; but it is also to affirm that, if only the
Dionysius, that we are best joined to God in this life				mind can shake itself free from all conceptions of
according to a type of ignorance which is "a kind of				that kind, it will be able to grasp his essence. For the
darkness, in which God is said to dwell."(14) We are				Gnostic, however, the matter goes far deeper. God
ignorant of God because God's infinite reality and				is unknown absolutely, both in his essence and in his
perfection surpass and exceed every conception of				existence; he is the one of whom, in the strictest
our intellect.(15) The ultimate human knowledge of				sense, nothing is known, and this situation can be
God occurs when someone "knows that he does not				overcome only through the Gnosis" (A History of
know God, inasmuch as he realizes that what God is				Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicea 2:
exceeds everything we understand about him."(16)				Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, and and ed. J.
Our learned ignorance is the result of our awareness				Baker [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973] 335-36). (3)
that God transcends our knowledge, and thus we				For two English translations of the Dionysian corpus,
know that God exceeds our knowledge without				see The Divine Names and Mystical Theology, trans.
knowing the divine transcendence itself. God dwells in				with Introduction by John Jones (Milwaukee:
a supereminent darkness, for the darkness of our				Marquette, 1980); The Complete Works, trans. Colm
ignorance is the direct consequence of God's infinitely				Luibheid (New York: Paulist, 1987). Other literature on
dazzling light, and the very admission of our ignorance				Pseudo-Dionysius: Vladimir Lossky, "La theologie
mysteriously evokes in some way a sense of God's				negative dans la doctrine de Denys l'Areopagite,"
infinite beyondness.				Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 28
However, Aquinas also softens the extreme negative				(1939) 204-21; Jean Vanneste, Le mystere de Dieu
theology of Dionysius and his adherents, for his own				(Brussels: Desclee, 1959); Walter M. Neidl, Thearchia:
negative theology is not a total and supreme				Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Gott bei
unknowing which leaves us in pure ignorance of God				Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und Thomas von Aquin
but teaches instead that God always exceeds every				(Regensburg: Habbel, 1976); John Jones, "The
kind of human knowledge.(17) He synthesizes his				Character of the Negative (Mystical) Theology
view of God's incomprehensibility in two theses: that				for;Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite," Proceedings of the
no creature by its own natural powers can possess a				American Catholic Philosophical Association 51 (1977)
quidditative grasp of God's essence, which "remains				66-74; Salvatore Lilla, "The Notion of Infinitude in
totally unknown,"(18) but at best can know only that				Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita," Journal of Theological
God is and what God is not;(19) and that no creature				Studies 31 (1980) 93-103; Michel Corbin, "Negation et
can ever possess a comprehensive, infinite grasp of				transcendence dans l'oeuvre de Denys," RSPT 69
the divine essence, even in the beatific vision.				(1985) 41-76; Paul Rorem, Biblical and Liturgical
For Aquinas, to have a quidditative knowledge of				Symbols within the PseudoDionysian Synthesis
some object is to know it essentially, i.e. to have a				(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
definition of its essence which represents the object				1984). See also R. G. Williams, "The Via Negativa and
in a comprehensive way. This is precisely the kind of				the Foundations of Theology: An Introduction to the
knowledge we cannot possess of God in this life,				Thought of V. N. Lossky," in New Studies in
though it is possible through God's grace in the				Theology, no. 1, ed. S. Sykes and D. Holmes (London:
beatific vision of heaven.(20) Until heaven, then,				Duckworth, 1980) 95-117. (4) The Divine Names 7.3
when the divine mystery will be directly present to				(872A). Citations within parentheses or brackets refer
our consciousness, God cannot be known essentially				to the third volume of Migne's Patrologia Graeca. (5)
by any creaturely kind of knowledge, since no				Ibid. 1.4 (593A). (6) Ibid. 1.6 (596A). (7) Ibid. 1.6
creature whose being and essence are distinct can				(596ABC). (8) Ibid. 7.3 (872A). (9) Ibid. 13.3 (981AB;
represent the God whose being and essence are				Luibheid trans. 130). This passage and many others
identical, for every creaturely bit of knowledge is				(ibid. 1.1 [588AB]; 7.3 [872AB]; Celestial Hierarchy, 2.3
limited to some finite aspect of reality and thus				[141A]; Letter 9.1 [1105CD]; Mystical Theology 3
cannot represent God's infinite supereminence.				[1032D-1033D]) display the superiority, in Dionysius's
Moreover, no created intellect, whose existence is a				eyes, of the mystical way of negation. Lossky has
finite participation in God's existence, can by its own				some fine words on the Dionysian mystical way of
natural powers see the essence of God, who is the				unknowing, which requires spiritual detachment,
infinite and subsisting act of existence itself.(21)				purgation, and the continual denial of predicates in
Even more radically for Thomas, however, God's				order to prepare for ecstasy, union, and finally
incomprehensibility means that no created intellect will				divinization ("Theologie negative" 211-18). (10) Divine
ever grasp God as much as God is able to be				Names 13.3 (980B-981B). (11) Letter 9.1 (1105D;
grasped, even in heaven's eternal beatific vision.(22)				Luibheid trans. 293). Dionysius remarks that Blessed
The reason is God's unique status as the infinite act				Hierotheus, his esteemed teacher, was instructed
of subsisting being, which no creature can ever				(the word muein originally meant to be initiated into
comprehend infinitely.(23) He expresses the				the mysteries) by divine inspiration, "not only learning
difference between seeing and comprehending God in				but also experiencing the divine things" (Divine Names
heaven by a clever use of different grammatical				2.9 [648B]; Luibheid trans. 65). The reference to
forms of the same word: "God's very infinity will be				initiation reflects the liturgical underpinnings of
seen but it will not be seen infinitely, God's total				Dionysius's mystical theology; his Ecclesiastical
essence will be seen but not totally."(24)				Hierarchy also developsin epistemology of
Paradoxically, the blessed will see God's infinity				sacramental symbols as ways to God. Rorem's study
without comprehending it:(25) "Whoever sees God in				(above, n. 3) points out the many biblical allusions and
essence, sees that which in God exists infinitely and				liturgical symbols which undergird the positive
is infinitely knowable, but this infinite mode does not				theology of the Divine Names. (12) A more extended
belong to the seer so that he himself should know				argument for this position may be found in Gregory
infinitely, just as someone can know with probability				Rocca, "Analogy as Judgment and Faith in God's
that some proposition is demonstrable though he				Incomprehensibility: A study in the Theological
himself does not know it demonstratively."(26)				Epistemology of Thomas Aquinas" (Ph.D. dies.,
In addition to these two theses, Thomas puts				Catholic University of America [Ann Arbor, Mich.:
forward a tamer version of the Dionysian via				University Microfilms International, 1989] 73-86). (13)
negativa so that it becomes, not a mystical way to				Summa contra gentiles (SCG), ed. C. Pera (Rome:
God beyond the boundaries of rational, affirmative				Marietti, 1961) 3.49.2270. (14) Scriptum super libros
theology, as in Dionysius, but one of three moments				Sententiarum (SS) 1.8.1.1.ad 4. Joseph Owens
within the overall structure of affirmative theology				comments on this "darkness of ignorance" in
which serves to correct the deficiencies and				"Aquinas--'Darkness of Ignorance' in the Most Refined
univocalist tendencies of that theology. He often				Notion of God," in Bonaventure and Aquinas: Enduring
affirms that we know God in three connected ways:				Philosophers, ed. R. W. Shahan and F. J. Kovach
by causality, negation, and supereminence.(27) For				(Norman, Okla.: Univ. of Oklahoma, 1976) 69-86. He
example, we know God is holy because God is the				sees the darkness as signifying for Aquinas our
cause of our holiness, but we also know that God is				nonconceptual and nonquidditative knowledge of God,
not holy in the same way as we are holy, not				where there is "privation of both intuitional and
because God's holiness is less than ours but because				conceptual light" (86). (15) SS 1.2.1.3; De Veritate (DV)
it transcends ours by its own supereminent, infinite				2.1; SCG 1.14; cf. SS 1.34.3.1.; 4.49.2.6-7; DV 10.11. (16)
excellence. Thus, the second or negative moment, by				De potentia (DP) 7.5.ad 14; also Expositio super librum
recourse to the third moment's heightened				De causis 6.160; Expositio super librum Dionysii De
awareness of God's supreme excellence, corrects				divinis nominibus (DDN) 7.4.731. (17) Summa theologiae
any possible univocalist misunderstandings of the first				(ST) 1.12.1.ad 1,3; 1.12.7.ad 2. (18) SCG 3.49.2270. (19)
moment's positive affirmation which is based on				Thomas expresses this view many times (SS 1.3.1.3;
God's gracious causality.				1.8.1.1; SCG 1.11.66,69; 1.12.78; DP 7.2.ad 1,11). (20) SS
In practice, Thomas's negative theology can take				1.2.1.3; 3.24.1.1.2; 3.24.1.2.1; 3.35.2.2.2; 4.10.1.4.5;
three different forms.(28) First, he often speaks of				4.49.2.1.ad 3; 4.49.2.7.ad 8; DV 2.1.ad 9; 8.1; 10.11; SCG
what may be called qualitative negations, which deny				1.3.16-17; 1.25.233-34; 3.49.2268; DP 7.5.ad 1, ad 5, ad
some quality of God on the grounds that it is				6, ad 9; ST 1.3.5; 1.12.2; Compendium theologiae (CT)
intrinsically imperfect and thus incompatible with God's				1.26. (21) ST 1.12.2,4. John Wippel asserts that
perfection: e.g., God is incorporeal, immutable, and				from,the very beginning of his career Thomas taught
without any temporal succession. This is the sort of				that we have no quidditative knowledge of God, and
negation Aquinas has in mind whenever he says that				that when Thomas says that what God is remains
although we cannot know what God is, we can				totally unknown to us, he is taking quidditative
know what God is not. Second, he describes what				knowledge strictly, in the sense of a comprehensive
might be called objective modal negations: these are				or defining knowledge (Metaphysical Themes in
corrective negative judgments applied to positive				Thomas Aquinas [Washington: Catholic University of
divine perfections which deny that those perfections				America, 1984] 238-41). (22) Karl Rahner sees this as
are subject to any objective creaturely mode or				Thomas's more radical view of God's
limitation. For example, when we say in a positive				incomprehensibility ("An Investigation of the
fashion that God is good, we do not mean that God				Incomprehensibility of God in St. Thomas Aquinas,"
is good in the same way that humans are good,				Theological Investigations [New York: Seabury, 1979]
since we, unlike God, follow moral laws and have to				16:244-54) and prefers himself to speak of God's
struggle with our emotions in order to be good.(29)				"holy inconceivability" ("The Experiences of a Catholic
Finally, Aquinas recognizes what might be termed				Theologian," Communio 11 [1984] 404-14, at 406).
subjective modal negations: these deny that the				See also Paul Wess, Wie von Gott sprechen? Eine
subjective, human way in which we understand				Auseinandersetzung mit Karl Rahner (Graz: Styria,
positive divine perfections are to be attributed to				1970). Elizabeth Johnson retrieves the tradition of
those perfections themselves. For example, when we				God's incomprehensibility al a critical resource for
say "God is wise," the proposition signifies				feminist theological discourse ("The
semantically that an accidental quality inheres in a				Incomprehensibility of God and the Image of God
subject, but this does not mean that God's wisdom is				Male and Female," TS 45 [1984] 441-65; She Who Is
actually an accidental quality inhering in God, for in				[New York: Crossroad, 1992] 104-20). (23) SS 1.2.1.3;
reality divine wisdom is identical with the divine nature				1.3.1.1; 3.14.1.2.1; 4.49.2.3; SCG 3.49.2268; 3.55; ST
itself.(30)				1.12.7; 1.62.9; 1-2.4.3; 2-2.27.5; 3.10.1; DDN 1.1.34; DP
For Aquinas, our knowledge of God can grow as we				7.3.ad 5; DV 8.1.ad 9; 8.2; 20.4-5; CT 1.106; 1.216. (24)
add the negations one to another, and we approach				DV 8.2.ad 6; cf. 8.4.ad 6; DP 7.1.ad 2. (25) Rahner
closer to the divine mystery by denying more and				realizes the mystery of heaven's beatific vision,
more imperfections of God and by realizing ever				especially when we remember that the blessed see
more deeply that we cannot impute to God our finite				God as a simple whole and as incomprehensible: "The
and creaturely modes of being and understanding. In				assertion of the direct vision of God and assertion of
a text imbued with mysticism, in which Thomas				his incomprehensibility are related for us here and
shows himself a worthy successor of Dionysius, the				now in a mysterious and paradoxical dialetic" ("An
continuing negations finally burst the confines of all				Investigation" 247). (26) ST 1.12.7.ad 3. H.-F. Dondaine,
rational pursuits and lead us into the darkness of				in an article replete with rich historical data, manifests
ignorance:				how Thomas displayed his originality in keeping to a
When we proceed into God through the way of				middle course between the Augustinians and Albert
negation, first we deny of him all corporeal things;				the Great on the question of whether we know God
and next, we even deny intellectual things as they				essentially or comprehensively ("Cognoscere que Deo
are found in creatures, like goodness and wisdom,				'quid est'," Recherches de theologie ancienne et
and then there remains in our understanding only the				medievale 22 [1955] 72-78). (27) DDN 1.3.104; 7.1.702;
fact that God exists, and nothing further, so that it				SCG 3.49.2270; DP 9.7; ST 1.11.3.ad 2; 1.13.10.ad.5. (28)
suffers a kind of confusion. Lastly, however, we				For more on the three forms of Aquinas's negative
even remove from him his very existence, as it is in				theology, see Rocca, "Analogy as Judgment" 151-58.
creatures, and then our understanding remains in a				(29) Objective modal negations are the same as the
certain darkness of ignorance according to which, as				via negativa understood as the second moment of
Dionysius says, we are best united to God in this				the threefold way to God, which means that
present state of life; and this is a sort of thick				Aquinas's negative theology encompasses more than
darkness in which God is said to dwell.(31)				the via negativa. (30) For a full account of Aquinas'
AQUINAS THE POSITIVE THEOLOGIAN				treatment of subjective modal negations, see
Through his own prayer and his reading of mystics				Gregory Rocca, "The Distinction between Res
like Dionysius, Aquinas certainly learned the ways of				Significata and Modus Significandi in Aquinas's
negative theology, but he was also a more insistent				Theological Epistemology," Thomist 55 (1991) 173-97.
positive theologian than the majority of mystics, at				(31) SS 1.8.1.1.ad 4; cf. DDN 13.3.996. (32) Although it is
least until that December day in 1273 when he				true that after 6 December 1273 Thomas added
underwent the mysterious experience that left him				nothing in writing to his major academic works then in
unable to write any more(32) and led him to consider				progress, scholars date his brief letter to the abbot
all he had written till then as mere straw. His view of				of Monte Cassino (Epistola ad Birnardum Abbatem
God -talk, at least until that last December of his life,				Casinensem) to early 1274 when he was on his way
is a subtle and intricate weaving of negative and				to the second council of Lyons. The letter deals with
positive theology, the latter being the more				a recondite issue about predestination found in
fundamental, even though in order to thrive as				Gregory the Great's Moralia. In this case, as also in
theologia it must first pass through the corrective				the legend about his commentary on the Song of
lenses of negative theology. The main reason why				Songs to the Cistercian monks of Fossanova during
Thomas's positive theology takes precedence over				the last few weeks of his life, Thomas's charity
his negative theology is that the foundational truth of				outweighed his disinclination to write or dictate. See
his entire systematic theology is the ringing				Antoine Dondaine, "La lettre de Saint Thomas a l'abbe
affirmation of God's pure positivity as ipsum esse				du Montcassin," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974:
subsistens, the subsisting act of being itself.(33)				Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute
Despite the many accents of his negative theology,				of Mediaeval Studies 1974) 1.87-108. (33) ST 1.3.4,
therefore, Aquinas continually asserts that we can				see Rocca, "Analogy as Judgment" 164-73, 462-93.
make true judgments about God's very nature and				(34) SS 1.2.1.3; 1.22.1.2; 1.35.1.1.ad 2; DV 2.1; DP 7.5-6,
being, whether by reason or by faith.(34) He				ST 1.13.2,6,12. (35) ST 1.13.2, cf. 1.13.6. (36) In many
opposes those who, like Maimonides, are so tightly				texts (SS 1.4.1.1; 1.34.3.2.ad 3; 1.45.1.4; DV 4.1.ad 10;
constrained by negative theology that they interpret				ST 1.13.3), Aquinas subdivides predications which refer
seemingly positive predications like "God is good" to				positively to God's being into those which are
mean only that God is not evil or that God causes				metaphorically true and those which are true
our goodness. Thomas argues that the positive				according to the proper and literal meaning of their
nature of predications like "God is good" cannot				terms (and by "literal" he does not mean an iconic
simply be reduced to such negative or causal				idea with a physical referent but rather the strict
interpretations. Rather, he claims that such				truth of a judgment). His theory of theological
predications tell us something true about God's very				analogy is meant to explain how we can speak
nature.				truthfully about God in a nonmetaphorical fashion.
When it is said that "God is good," the meaning is not				Contrariwise, much of contemporary writing on
"God is the cause of goodness" or "God is not evil,"				theological epistemology tends to blur the distinction
but "that which we call goodness in creatures				between metaphor and analogy. (37) Ed. P. N. Zammit
preexists in God," and preexists according to a higher				(Rome: Angelicum, 1934); trans. E. A. Bushinski and H.
mode. From all of this, then, it does not follow that				J. Koren, in The Analogy of Names and the Concept
to be good belongs to God insofar as he causes				of Being (Pittsburgh: Duquesne, 1953). (38) SS
goodness, but rather vice versa, that because he is				1.19.5.2.ad 1, and DV 2.11. (39) De nominum analogia,
good he diffuses goodness to things.(35)				chaps. 1-3. (40) Modern proponents of Cajetan's
Aquinas is quite willing to walk a tightrope, for				typology include George Phelan (Saint Thomas and
although his negative theology denies that we have				Analogy [Milwaukee: Marquette, 1941]); Eric Mascall
any intuitive concept of God's essence or being, his				(Existence and Analogy [London: Longmans, 1949]);
positive theology affirms that we can make true				James Anderson (The Bond of Being [St. Louis:
judgments about that same divine reality; and				Herder, 1949]); Jacques Maritain (The Degrees of
although he supports a robust via negativa, he will				Knowledge, trans. under the supervision of G. B.
not permit affirmative propositions about God to be				Phelan from the 4th French ed. [New York: Scribner,
reduced to a merely negative interpretation.				19559] 418-21). (41) Santiago Ramirez found that,
How can Aquinas hold all of this together? How can				contrary to Cajetan's view, the two texts from the
he swing between the poles of positive and negative				early Thomas are not parallel and thus not able to be
theology, partaking of both while being reduced to				combined into a total theory (De analogia, in Edicion
neither? He accomplishes this balancing act by means				de las obras completas de Santiago/Ramirez, O.P., ed.
of the analogical predication of the divine names.(36)				V. Rodriguez [Madrid: Instituto de Filosofia "Luis
But which type of analogy does Aquinas have in				Vives," 1970-72]/2/4.1811-50; the original article
mind, and what is the nature of that analogy? Up until				appeared in Sapientia 8 [1953] 166-92). George
about forty years ago the reigning interpretation of				Klubertanz and Bernard Montagnes discovered that,
Aquinas on analogy was that of the Dominican				although in the early text of De veritate 2.11 Thomas
Cardinal Cajetan de Vio, who, in his 1498 De nominum				had focused on the four-term analogy of
analogia et de conceptu entis,(37) proposed a				proportionality in order to protect God's infinite
fourfold typology of Thomistic analogy and explained				otherness, he later abandoned proportionality as the
the nature of genuine analogy in highly conceptualistic				only possible analogy between God and creatures
terms. Basing himself mainly on a combined reading of				once he realized that the direct two-term judgment
two early texts,(38) Cajetan holds that Aquinas				about God did not derogate from divine
recognizes only four analogical types: of inequality, of				transcendence (G. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on
attribution, of improper metaphorical proportionality,				Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic
and of proper proportionality.(39) According to				Synthesis [Chicago: Loyola Univ., 1960] 27, 86-100,
Cajetan, however, only the last type is genuine				109-10; and B. Montagnes, La doctrine de l'analogie de
analogy, for it alone posits real perfections in both				l'etre d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin [Louvain/Paris:
God and creatures, according to a fourfold				Publications Universitaires/Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1963]
proportionality (e.g., creatures' being : creatures ::				7-10, 65-66, 75-93). Hampus Lyttkens demonstrated
God's being: God). In the analogy of attribution,				that the analogy of proper proportionality is neither
however, the perfection only really exists in the				primary nor free of serious internal problems (The
prime analogate, while it is merely attributed to the				Analogy between God and the World, trans. A.
secondary analogates gates by reason of their				Poignant [Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1952] 49-54,
extrinsic relation to the prime analogate (e.g., the				63-74). Ralph McInerny marshaled trenchant reasons
human body is really healthy while food is only called				against Cajetan's insistence that all analogy of
healthy because it helps to keep the human body				attribution is extrinsic, proving that analogy for
really healthy). Cajetan thus denied any intrinsic real				Thomas, formally as such, is quite neutral with regard
analogy to direct two-term judgments like "God is				to whether the perfections in question are extrinsic
good," and equated genuine analogy with four-term				(as in the traditional example of the predicate
proportionalities.(40) But in the decade between the				"healthy," where only the primary analogate, the living
early 1950s and the early 1960s, several Thomists				body, is really healthy) or intrinsic (as in the traditional
began to criticize Cajetan's reading of Aquinas and				example of the predicate "being," where both the
concluded that Thomas recognizes the genuine				primary and secondary analogates, substance and
analogical nature of direct two-term judgments.(41)				accidents, are really instances of being) (The Logic of
Although a few today still follow the Cajetanian				Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas [The
interpretation, Cajetan's critics have largely won the				Hague: Nijhoff, 1961] chap. 1). (42) For more on the
debate over the proper typology of Thomistic				Cajetanian tradition and its critics, see Rocca,
analogy.(42)				"Analogy as Judgment" 25-37. (43) Opus Oxoniense,
The conceptualist tradition of analogy actually				Ordinatio 1.8.1.3, nos. 81-82, 1.3.1.1-2, nos. 26-30 (Opera
originates with John Duns Scotus. Combating the				Omnia, ed. C. Balic [Vatican City, 1950] 4:190, 3:18-20);
extreme equivocity he detects in Henry of Ghent,				Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam 4.1.5. (44)
Scotus holds that the concept of being is one, is				Cyril Shircel, The Univocity of the Concept of Being in
formally neutral vis-a-vis God and creatures, and is				the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, (Washington:
distinct from its finite and infinite modes in God and				Catholic Univ. of America, 1942); Etienne Gilson, Jean
creatures.(43) Since being is the simplest concept of				Duns Scot (Paris: Vrin, 1952); Michael Schmaus, Zur
all, and since every analogical predication involves at				Diskussion uber das Problem der Univozitat im
least some concept of being, all analogy is reducible				Umkreis des Johannes Duns Skotus (Munich:
to a common univocal core of being, with its various				Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1957). (45)
modes arranged like layers around it.(44) Attempting				De nominum analogia, chaps. 4-10. (46) Montagnes, La
to hew a middle course between Henry's equivocity				doctrine de l'analogie 150-58; Henri Bouillard, The
and Scotus's univocity, Cajetan describes the				Knowledge of God, trans. S. D. Femiano (New York:
"confused" unity of the analogous concept which lies				Herder and Herder, 1968) 105-7. (47) Etienne Gilson
at the heart of the genuine analogy of proper				writes that "the Thomist doctrine of analogy is
proportionality. The unity is confused because the				above all a doctrine of the judgment of analogy"
concept is only imperfectly abstracted from its real				(Jean Duns Scot 101). Claiming in general that analogy
modes in God and creatures (rather than being				is the semantic expression of the judgments
perfectly abstracted, as would occur with a fully				philosophers make and the result of how language
univocal concept), but even such a confused				must work in order to do justice to insight, David
analogical unity, according to Cajetan, is able to				Burrell also discerns in Aquinas a view of analogy as
escape Henry's equivocity without falling prey to				usage base) on insightful judgments (Analogy and
Scotus's univocity.(45)				Philosophical Language [New Haven: Yale, 1473] chaps.
Cajetan's analogous concept, however, with its				1-2, 6-7, 9). A few other scholars have also begun to
confused proportional unity, has been criticized on the				view analogy as judgmental rather than conceptual.
grounds that it is ultimately reducible to either				W. Norris Clarke sees analogy as based on our ability
univocity or equivocity.(46) Realizing that Aquinas				to make the judgments we do ("Analogy and the
never employs the conceptus analogus of Cajetan,				Meaningfulness of Language about God: A Reply to
who succumbed to Scotus's conceptualism even as				Kai Nielsen," Thomist 40 [1976] 61-95, at 64-72). For
he tried to avoid his univocalism, some authors(47)				Colman O'Neill, all analogy is judgmental because it
focus instead on judgment as a way of				occurs when a predicate is transferred from its
understanding Aquinas's use of analogy. Theological				normal linguistic context to a new one not originally
analogy,(48) in particular, is in Thomas's eyes the only				its own; to speak of "analogical concepts," he says, is
valid way of explaining epistemologically, in a				a "disastrous misunderstanding" ("La predication
secondary, after-the-fact reflection, what takes place				analogique: L'element negatif," in Analogie et
in the primary ontological and theological judgments				dialectique, eds. P. Gisel and P. Secretan [Geneva:
that bear upon God's very being.(49) Aquinas's				Labor et Fides, 1982] 81-91, at 82). He writes that
theological analogy is actually an epistemological				"the theological theory of proper analogical predication
reflection upon the truth status of the theological				deals with the very complex phenomenon of
judgments he has already made, and so one cannot				complete statements which express judgments
understand his view of analogy without appreciating				inspired by faith about the reality of God.... It is false
the truth of his basic theological positions.(50) And				to place this theory on the same footing as those
only if Thomas's use of theological analogy is				which deal only with concepts" ("Analogy, Dialectic,
understood more as a matter of judgments than of				and Inter-Confessioal Theology," Thomist 47 [1983]
concepts can it thread its way amidst various				43-65, at 57). (48) What Thomas means by analogy
threatening shoals.(51)				here is not to be infused with the so-called argument
One would look in vain, however, for an explicit				from analogy, which comprises four terms and is
statement from Aquinas that theological analogy is a				much used in biology and the other sciences; see
matter of theological judgments. My contention that				Mary Hesse, Models and Analogy in Science (Notre
his theological analogy is a matter of judgment is an				Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame, 1966). (49) See Rocca,
interpretation of his thought based on two main				"Analogy as Judgment" chaps. 6-7, 10, 13. (50) O'Neill
reasons: the positioning of analogy's treatment within				writes that theological analogy "has to do with the
his theological works; and the process of elimination				linguistic expression of a knowledge about God that is
by which he chooses analogy as the only possible				held, whether rightly or wrongly, to be already
way to understand epistemologically what takes				acquired and to be true, even thou"' necessarily
place in our talk about God. First, then, the very				imperfect. Those who speak in this way of analogical
placement of Thomas's treatment of theological				predication taken it as given that there are
analogy within the larger context of his treatise on				judgments about God, whether of faith or reason, in
the one God shows that for him such analogy				which, by means of concepts drawn from the
subsists in a secondary consideration reflecting back				created world, the human person attains the reality
upon primary theological judgments. In three of his				of God himself. All that the theory of analogy is
major works--the Summa theologiae, the				meant to do is to account for the oddities of
Compendium theologiae, and the Summa contra				linguistic expression which result from this conviction"
gentiles--he treats of analogy only after having				("Analogy" 45). (51) The conceptualistic understanding
proved to his own satisfaction that God exists, that				of analogy is rightfully subject to the critique of
God is one, simple and perfect, the pure and infinite				those who claim that since it is tantamount to
act of being, and that in creation God bestows the				univocity it derogates from God's glory and
Divine Mystery upon creatures by creating in them a				transcendence. Consider Barth's famous
likeness to the divine nature and persons. His				pronouncement against such a view of analogy: "I
discussion of analogy is situated after the treatment				regard the analogia entis as the invention of
of his core theological truths, not before, as would be				Antichrist, and think that because of it one cannot
our modern propensity.				become Catholic. Whereupon I at the same time
The second reason for viewing Thomistic analogy as				allow myself to regard all other possible reasons for
a matter of judgment is the manner in which Thomas				not becoming Catholic as shortsighted and lacking in
portrays analogy as a mean between univocity and				seriousness" (Church Dogmatics [Edinburgh: T. & T.
equivocity. For him, there are only three possibilities				Clark, 1936-77] 1/1.x). Elizabeth Johnson summarizes
for understanding what goes on epistemologically				Pannenberg's critique of analogy so understood:
when we talk about God's very being in a				"Analogy is a relation requiring a logos common to
nonmetaphorical manner--univocity, equivocity, and				both analogates. The structure of analogy
analogy--and once he has rejected the first two				understood in this way held good from primitive
alternatives on the grounds of his previous theological				human thought to the Neoplatonic causal schema,
judgments, analogy is the only option left. In the				and no subsequent concept of analogy, whether
Summa theologiae, e.g., he refuses univocity since it				early Christian, medieval, or modern, has ever broken
detracts from God's unity, simplicity, and				through the confines of that Neoplatonic schema and
incomprehensibility:				its presupposition .... If one is opposed to univocity,
Nothing can be predicated univocally about God and				however slight, existing in the essential characteristics
creatures, since no effect whose production does				of Creator and creature, one must oppose analogy"
not require the total power of its agent cause can				("The Right Way to Speak about God? Pannenberg
receive a full likeness of the agent, but only a partial				on Analogy," TS 43 [1982] 673-92, at 687). (52) ST
one; so that what occurs among effects separately				1.13.5. (53) Ibid. (54) SCG 1.34.297. This move is simply
and plurally, exists in the cause simply and unitedly, as				the epistemological correlative of Aquinas's ontological
the sun by its single force produces many different				rejection of any reality beyond or above God,
forms in all things beneath it. Likewise, all perfections				whether it be Greek Necessity/ Fate, Platonic Forms,
existing in creatures separately and plurally, preexist in				or Whiteheadian Creativity. (55) Analogy for Aquinas
God unitedly. Thus, whenever any perfection term is				is a kind of systematic and intelligible ambiguity or
predicated of a creature, it signifies that perfection				equivocity, as distinct from a haphazard and
as distinct in idea from all others: e.g., when we call a				accidental homonymy. The idea of an intelligible
human wise we signify a perfection that is distinct				ambiguity goes back to Aristotle) logic and
from the essence, power or existence of humans;				metaphysics, whereas the name analogia finds its
but when we call God wise we do not intend to				home in mathematical and biological contexts. See
signify anything distinct from the divine essence,				Rocca, "Analogy as Judgment" 179-96; Harry
power or existence. And so, when wise is predicated				Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and
of a human, the name somehow circumscribes and				Religion, ed. Isadore Twersky and George Williams
comprehends the reality meant; but this is not the				(Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 1977) 1:455-77; 2:514-23.
case with God, where wise does not comprehend				(56) A detailed investigation of what Thomas
the divine reality but lets it remain as surpassing the				understands by analogical discourse may be found in
name's meaning. It is clear, then, that the name wise				Rocca, "Analogy as Judgment" chaps. 6-7. (57) SCG
is not predicated with an identical meaning of God				1.34.298. (58) SS 1.24.1.1.ad 4; 1.48.1.1.ad 3; 1.35.1.4; DV
and humans, and the same can be said for all other				2.11; 10.13.ad 3; SCG 1.32-34; DP 7.7; ST 1.13.5-6,10.
names.(52)				See Montagnes, La doctrine de l'analogie 67-70,
Since Thomas already knows through his first-order				181-83; Hampus Lyttkens, "Die Bedeutung der
theological judgments that God is one, simple and				Gottespradikate bei Thomas von Aquin," Neue
incomprehensible, univocity cannot be a valid option				Zeitschrift fur systermatische Theologie und
for his second-order theological epistemology. The				Religionsphilosophie 6 (1964) 280-83. (59) J. H. Nicolas
same article goes on also to reject pure equivocity				is uncomfortable with any paradoxical interpretation
as a valid option since, if the divine names were				that underscores the extreme negativity of Aquinas's
equivocal, "then nothing at all could be known or				theology, for Thomas spent his whole life searching
demonstrated about God on the basis of creatures,				for and saying "ce que Dieu est," and it is
for one's reasoning would always be exposed to the				contradictory to say that one knows the divine
fallacy of equivocation"; but Thomas affirms that				essence attributes without knowing the divine
philosophers and Paul the Apostle (and presumably				essence partially known ("Affirmation de Dieu et
theologians like himself) have claimed to know some				connaissance," Revue thomiste 64 [1964] 200-222, at
truths about God based on the nature of creation.				200-204, 221-22). Nicolas's position, however, is
Finally, after this process of elimination, the same				directly rooted in his assessment of what Thomas
article maintains that names such as "wise" must be				understands by judgment and truth: since judgment is
predicated of God and creatures according to				nothing more than the application of a previously
analogy, i.e. proportion (which is the original				known form or concept to a subject, then any true
etymological meaning of the Greek analogia).				judgment about God will have to use a concept of
Names are predicated according to proportion in two				God's essence or attributes which in some manner
ways: either because many things bear a proportion				attains "ce que Dieu est"; for him, then, to posit that
to one reality, as medicine and urine are called healthy				our affirmations of God imply no knowledge, even
insofar as both possess an order and proportion to				imperfect, of what God is, cannot be consistent with
the animal's health, since medicine is a cause of health				Thomas's notion of truth. See Denis Bradley,
and urine is one of its signs; or because one thing				"Thomistic Theology and the Hegelian Critique of
bears a direct proportion to the other, as medicine				Religious imagination," New Scholasticism 59 (1985)
and the animal are called healthy insofar as medicine				60-78, at 77-78. Wess also sees an incompatibility
is the cause of the health which exists in the animal.				between Thomas's notions of the mystery and the
And in this second way some things are predicated				natural knowability of God, but it is clear he does not
of God and creatures analogically, neither purely				understand the difference between judgment and
equivocally nor univocally. For we are not able to				quidditative insight in Thomas when, in a Kantian
name God except from creatures, and thus				fashion, he criticizes the Thomistic proofs for God's
whatever is said about God and creatures is				existence because they cryptically rely on the
predicated inasmuch as the creature is ordered to				Anselmian ontological proof, which requires an
God as to its causal principle in whom all the				adequate concept of God (Wie von Gott sprechen?
perfections of things preexist surpassingly. Now the				107, 123-26). (60) O'Neill notes that since judgments
analogical type of commonality is a mean between				use concepts, there is a paradox inherent in all
pure equivocity and simple univocity. For in analogical				theological discourse: theological judgments affirm
predications there is neither one meaning, as occurs in				transcendence even though by means of limited
univocal predications, nor totally diverse meanings, as				concepts ("La predication" 87-89; "Analogy" 52, 57).
occurs in equivocal predications, but the name which				Those who speak of theological analogy as a
is predicated analogically in multiple ways signifies				projection, perspective, or tending towards God are
different proportions to one single reality: as when				also aware of this paradox (Edward Schillebeeckx,
healthy, said of urine, refers to the sign of an animal's				Revelation and Theology [New York: Sheed and
health, but when said of medicine signifies the cause				Ward, 1968] 167,175, 177, 205-6; William Hill, Knowing
of that same health.(53)				the Unknown God [New York: Philosophical Library,
Thomas does not clarify why he favors the				1971] 88-97, 123; 144). Gilson remarks that true
one-to-one over the many-to-one proportion, but it is				analogical judgments about God orient us toward a
clear from elsewhere that it has to do with his desire				goal, "the direction of which is known to us but
to underscore divine freedom and transcendence, for				which, because it is at infinity, is beyond the reach of
if God and creatures were given a common name by				our natural forces" (The Christian Philosophy of St.
reference to some third reality, then in his view that				Thomas Aquinas [New York: Random, 1956] 110).
third reality would somehow be prior to God and

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